Niemiecki historyk: Stalin ponosi współwinę za wybuch II wojny światowej

Jacek Lepiarz (PAP)

Źródło: polona.pl

Niemcy ponoszą główną winę za II wojnę światową, ale nie wolno pomijać współwiny Związku Sowieckiego – uważa historyk Manfred Kittel. Bez porozumienia Hitlera ze Stalinem w 1939 r. uderzenie III Rzeszy na Polskę i dalsze prowadzenie wojny byłyby znacznie trudniejsze – argumentuje na łamach „FAZ”.

Netanyahu Calls Erdogan an ‘Antisemitic Dictator’ as Turkey Seeks International Arrest Warrant for Israeli PM

Debbie Weiss

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan speaks during a ceremony for the handover of new vehicles to the gendarmerie and police forces in Istanbul, Turkey, Nov. 28, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Murad Sezer

Israeli Prime Minister Benjaman Netanyahu’s office on Friday lambasted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an “antisemitic dictator” hours after Turkey said it would seek an international arrest warrant for Netanyahu.

The latest developments further escalated already high tensions between the two countries following Israel’s strike earlier this week on a Syrian airbase over Israeli concerns regarding the potential deployment of Turkish troops there.

In the Israeli statement, Netanyahu’s office vowed to combat Erdogan’s “aggression” in the Middle East and described the Turkish effort to get him arrested as a “pathetic” way to try to intimidate Israel.

“Erdogan is an antisemitic dictator who has massacred Kurds, harbors Hamas terrorists, occupies half of Cyprus, and jails record numbers of journalists and politicians who oppose him,” the statement said. “He now seeks to extend his aggression against Israel into Syria. Israel will not tolerate it.”

Netanyahu’s office added, “Erdogan’s pathetic attempt to intimidate the leaders and soldiers of Israel, the only true democracy in the Middle East, will go nowhere.”

The statement came after Turkey earlier on Friday said it would seek an Interpol red notice for the arrest of Netanyahu as part of a domestic criminal case linked to Israel’s interception of an activist flotilla bound for Gaza.

An Interpol red notice is a global alert to police forces worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person, but it does not legally compel any country to make an arrest. Instead, the measure relies on a national arrest warrant or court order issued by a specific country or international tribunal.

Turkish Justice Minister Akin Gurlek announced the move on social media, saying that arrest warrants had been issued for Netanyahu and another suspect on charges that included “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” as part of a case before an Istanbul court against 35 people concerning Israel’s interception of the Gaza-bound flotilla.

“A request has been made to our Ministry of Interior for the issuance of a red notice at the international level for their search, and the relevant documents have been forwarded to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Gurlek posted.

As part of the Global Sumud Flotilla, anti-Israel activists have tried multiple times to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza, claiming they aim to deliver humanitarian aid to the enclave. Israeli authorities have noted that the amount of aid on the flotillas have been tiny in comparison to the humanitarian aid entering Gaza, calling the activist effort a “PR stunt.” Each time Israeli forces have intercepted the ships.

Israel launched its blockade to prevent Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that ruled Gaza before the war and currently controls about 40 percent of its territory, from getting weapons and other supplies to attack the Jewish state.

Since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in October 2023, Erdogan has emerged as one of Israel’s fiercest critics on the global stage, comparing the country to Nazi Germany and even threatening to invade.

However, tensions skyrocketed even further earlier this week over Syria.

Israel warned Turkey on Thursday against “dangerous adventures” in Syria, two days after striking an airbase where it said Ankara was preparing to deploy troops.

Erdogan is “dragging Turkey into dangerous adventures in Syria. Israel will not allow any actor to threaten its security,” Defense Minister Israel Katz wrote on X. “He would be better off continuing to deliver empty, fantastical speeches against Israel in the Turkish parliament rather than testing Israel’s determination to defend itself.”

Turkey’s Defense Ministry hit back, saying Ankara would continue supporting Syria’s efforts to develop its military capabilities and infrastructure. “It is essential for the peace and stability of both Syria and the region that Israel ceases such reckless attacks and complies with the requirements of international law,” the ministry said.

The exchange followed Israel’s strike on Tuesday on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, where Israeli officials said Turkey was preparing to establish a military presence. The attack damaged runways and hangars at the base, which had recently undergone reconstruction.

Netanyahu said Israel had warned Ankara against moving forces into the area before the strike. “We made it clear to Turkey: Don’t,” he said Wednesday. “Apparently they didn’t hear the message, so we made sure they understood it better.”

Syrian officials disputed Israel’s account, saying there had been no plan to establish a Turkish base or permanent troop presence at Abu al-Duhur. Turkey’s Defense Ministry also denied that a Turkish military delegation was at the base before or during the Israeli strike.

Four days before the attack, Mossad chief Roman Gofman spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani in one of the highest-level known contacts between Israel and Syria’s new government, Reuters reported Wednesday, citing three people familiar with the matter. Turkey’s military role was a central subject of the call, with Gofman raising Israeli concerns about Turkish troop deployments, weapons sales, and drones supplied to the Syrian military, according to the report. 

The strike was the clearest sign yet that Israel is prepared to use force to prevent Ankara from establishing military capabilities there that could threaten Israel or restrict its freedom of action, an approach Eitan Shamir, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, said was based on “similar logic” to Israel’s years-long campaign against Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria.

Shamir drew a distinction, however, between Turkey’s role today and the much deeper relationship Iran had with Syria under former President Bashar al-Assad.

“It was a kind of exchange,” he told The Algemeiner. The Iranians “guaranteed the regime’s survival, and the [Assad] regime opened the door to them completely. The idea was to build a front directly against Israel.”

From Israel’s point of view, the response is essentially the same, he said.

“We don’t like either of them. We’re telling everyone that there is a red line, and if you cross it, we will act. We will destroy everything you are building and everything you are doing.”

However, Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center, said Israel was careful not to jeopardize longstanding ties with Turkey, which date back to Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 and, unlike its relations with many regional neighbors, did not require a formal peace treaty. 

“Turning Turkey into an active enemy would be contrary to Israel’s national security interests,” he told The Algemeiner. “The main objective of the latest strike was precisely to prevent a more serious confrontation with Turkey in Syria and to reduce the potential for further friction between the two countries.”

According to Shamir, Turkey views Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government as a client state after helping him in his fight against Assad. 

“The Turks see Syria completely as their backyard,” he said. 

Ankara, Shamir added, views northern Syria as an area under “quasi-Turkish sovereignty,” with Turkish forces already deployed there and a de facto security zone along the Turkish border.

Turkey has become one of al-Sharaa’s closest foreign backers since Assad was ousted in December 2024. Ankara and Damascus signed a military cooperation accord in 2025, under which Turkey agreed to provide training, weapons systems, and logistical equipment to Syria’s military. Shamir described al-Sharaa as “a kind of protégé or even a proxy” for Turkey.

The growing ties have also extended to the Mediterranean. Turkish Naval Forces Commander Adm. Ercument Tatlioglu traveled to Syria’s Latakia port aboard the TCG Istanbul frigate in July, the first visit by Turkish naval vessels to the port since the Syrian civil war began. Turkish and Syrian commanders held talks on expanding military cooperation and inspected Latakia’s military port as part of Ankara’s support for the restructuring of Syria’s armed forces.

From Israel’s perspective, Shamir said, the concern is that Turkey could expand its military presence farther south, closer to Israel, a development he described as “very, very bad.”

Israel faced a similar problem when Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015. Nine days before Russian combat operations began, Netanyahu flew to Moscow with then-IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot and military intelligence chief Herzi Halevi to establish a deconfliction mechanism with President Vladimir Putin. The arrangement lasted nearly a decade, allowing Israel to carry out hundreds of strikes against Iran and Hezbollah in Syria without directly confronting Russian forces. 

Washington, meanwhile, has sought to keep the escalating tensions from turning into a direct clash between two of its regional partners.  

“Erdogan has Trump’s ear,” Shamir said, referring to US President Donald Trump. 

US special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack called Israel’s strike an “unnecessary escalation” and said the Trump administration was working on a deconfliction mechanism among Israel, Turkey, and Syria to allow the sides to exchange information and reduce the risk of an accidental confrontation.

Rachel Goldberg-Polin, mother of murdered Oct. 7 hostage, represents victims of terrorism at UN

JERUSALEM POST STAFF

Rachel Goldberg-Polin speaks in a recorded message at the United Nations International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism, August 21, 2026. /  (photo credit: Screenshot/Courtesy Rachel Goldberg-Polin)

Rachel Goldberg-Polin, mother of the murdered Gaza hostage Hersh Goldberg-Polin, represented Middle Eastern victims of terrorism at the United Nations on Friday in honor of the International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism.

“My name is Rachel,” she began, “and I will always be the mother of Hersh Goldberg-Polin.”

RACHEL AND JON Goldberg-Polin attend the funeral of their son, Hersh, in Jerusalem. (credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH 90)

Hersh’s experience at the hands of Hamas

John Fetterman daje Jonowi Stewartowi lekcję o Izraelu

Bob Goldberg

Senator z Pensylwanii wyjaśnia, że antysyjonizm nigdy nie kończy się na Izraelu – i dlaczego obrona państwa żydowskiego nie oznacza nielojalności wobec Ameryki.

Jon Stewart próbował pouczyć senatora z Pensylwanii Johna Fettermana o różnicy między Żydami a Izraelem. Fetterman odpowiedział Stewartowi, że obrona Izraela oznacza obronę Żydów na całym świecie.

Wtedy Stewart przeszedł do argumentacji w stylu „jako Żyd”, mówiąc senatorowi: „Społeczność żydowska i Izrael to nie jest to samo, bracie. To nie jest to samo”.

Fetterman odparł w istocie, że Izrael jest politycznym wyrazem żydowskiej wspólnoty narodowej – ojczyzną, schronieniem i środkiem samoobrony stworzonym po stuleciach, w których Żydzi przekonali się, jaką cenę płaci się za uzależnienie własnego przetrwania od innych.

Dlatego też – argumentował – Partia Demokratyczna przekracza polityczną czerwoną linię, gdy staje się antyizraelska, atakuje Izrael i usprawiedliwia Hamas. Stewart nie krył niedowierzania: jak Fetterman może zgadzać się z progresistami w większości kwestii polityki wewnętrznej, a jednocześnie odrzucać ich stanowisko w sprawie Izraela?

Wówczas Stewart ponownie sięgnął po argument „jako Żyd”, stwierdzając: „Izrael to nie jest nasz kraj”.

„Jako Żyd” kontra wartości żydowskie. (Fot. WESA90)

Z geograficznego punktu widzenia Stewart miał całkowitą rację. Fetterman reprezentuje Pensylwanię, a nie Petach Tikwę. Tyle że Fetterman nigdy nie twierdził niczego przeciwnego. Powiedział jedynie, że porzucenie Izraela jest dla niego nieprzekraczalną czerwoną linią – nie zaś, że Izrael jest jego krajem.

Mimo to sformułowanie Stewarta niosło wyraźną insynuację: że poparcie Fettermana dla państwa żydowskiego czyni jego lojalność wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych podejrzaną.

Odpowiedź Stewarta: „to nie jest nasz kraj” była tym bardziej nieuczciwa, że Fetterman wcześniej wyjaśnił już, dlaczego Izrael ma znaczenie dla Ameryki.

Fetterman zalicza Izrael do grona państw takich jak Ukraina i Tajwan – demokracji przeciwstawiających się antydemokratycznej agresji. Wielokrotnie mówił, że wspieranie tych sojuszników pokazuje, „po czyjej stronie stoimy i jakie wartości reprezentujemy”. Argumentował również, że wspieranie sojuszników broniących się przed agresją nigdy nie powinno budzić kontrowersji.

Stewart potraktował jednak poparcie dla Izraela jako dowód niewłaściwie ulokowanej lojalności. Ukrainy można bronić w imię demokracji. Tajwanu można bronić w imię odstraszania. Ale gdy ktoś broni Izraela, nagle przypomina mu się, że „to nie jest nasz kraj”.

Czy Stewart powiedziałby to samo senatorowi, który uznaje przetrwanie Ukrainy za moralny imperatyw? Czy przerwałby pełną zaangażowania obronę Kijowa, by oznajmić, że Ukraina „to nie jest nasz kraj”? Czy poparcie dla Tajwanu również wywołałoby pytania o to, które państwo reprezentuje amerykański senator?

Oczywiście, że nie. Popierasz Ukrainę – bronisz demokracji. Popierasz Palestyńczyków – bronisz praw człowieka. Popierasz Izrael – i nagle twój patriotyzm wymaga zbadania.

Stewart ujawnił także, gdzie sam lokuje swoją lojalność. Nie przy jakiejś surowej doktrynie „America First”. Jest ona związana z progresywną ortodoksją, która akceptuje zaangażowanie we wszystkie modne sprawy międzynarodowe – z wyjątkiem przetrwania narodu żydowskiego.

Ta ortodoksja pozwala Żydom istnieć jako jednostkom – najlepiej zaniepokojonym i pełnym poczucia winy. Pozwala im pamiętać o prześladowaniach, pod warunkiem że nie wyciągają z nich żadnych politycznych wniosków. Mogą modlić się zwróceni ku Jerozolimie, o ile nie wysuwają wobec niej żadnych roszczeń. Mogą opłakiwać żydowską bezsilność, o ile nigdy nie zdobędą żydowskiej siły.

Antysyjonistyczny napastnik nie zatrzymuje się przed synagogą, aby sprawdzić, którzy wierni popierają Benjamina Netanjahu. Wandale nie badają stanowiska żydowskiego centrum społecznościowego wobec osiedli, zanim wybiją w nim szyby. Prześladowca nękający żydowskiego studenta nie rozróżnia starannie między syjonistą, liberalnym syjonistą, niesyjonistą a antysyjonistą.

Dlatego właśnie antysyjonizm nie pozostaje sterylnym sporem o granice. Gdy Izrael zostaje uznany za wyjątkowo zły – kolonialny, rasistowski, dopuszczający się ludobójstwa – Żydzi stają się domniemanymi przedstawicielami tego państwa. Synagogi, szkoły żydowskie, żydowskie przedsiębiorstwa i pojedynczy Żydzi stają się celami ataków.

Czy można krytykować Izrael bez popadania w antysemityzm? Oczywiście. Izrael jest demokracją, a nie świętością. Jego premierzy, działania wojskowe, osiedla i polityka mogą być przedmiotem ostrej debaty.

Jak zauważył Charles Krauthammer (o czym wielokrotnie pisałem), ocenianie Izraela według standardów, których nie stosuje się wobec żadnego innego państwa, oraz systematyczne potępianie państwa żydowskiego za działania tolerowane gdzie indziej nie jest stawianiem Izraelowi wyższych wymagań – jest dyskryminacją. „A dyskryminacja wobec Żydów również ma swoją nazwę” – podsumował. „Tą nazwą jest antysemityzm”. Kiedy Stewart, występując „jako Żyd”, odnosi do Izraela podejrzenia, których nie kieruje wobec żadnego porównywalnego sojusznika, jest antysemitą.

Ponieważ Fetterman odmawia porzucenia Izraela, sam doświadcza dziś tego dyskryminacyjnego standardu.

Podobnie jak Izrael, Fetterman musi najpierw udowodnić swoją legitymację, zanim jego argumenty zostaną w ogóle wysłuchane. Izrael musi dowodzić swojego prawa do istnienia, zanim będzie mógł się bronić. Fetterman musi udowodnić swoją lojalność wobec Ameryki, zanim będzie mógł bronić Izraela.

Stewart zasugerował, że popieranie Izraela jako państwa żydowskiego prowadzącego wojnę z islamistycznym kultem śmierci jest niemal zdradą. Można się spodziewać, że każdy antysyjonistyczny kandydat ubiegający się o urząd będzie przy każdej okazji wykorzystywał ten argument do odpierania krytyki. Fetterman dostrzega to, czego historia nauczyła Żydów: kiedy kampania przeciwko żydowskiej suwerenności odnosi sukces, bardzo rzadko kończy się na suwerennym państwie żydowskim.

Izrael może nie być krajem Fettermana. Rozumie on jednak, że Ameryka i Izrael zostały zbudowane na tej samej nadrzędnej zasadzie: że wolny naród ma prawo sam sobą rządzić i sam się bronić. Rozumie również mroczniejszą prawdę, o której Stewart woli zapomnieć – że bez Izraela Żydzi znów stają się wszędzie niemile widzianymi gośćmi i nigdzie nie mogą czuć się bezpiecznie.

Palestinians’ Preferred Leaders: A Convicted Fatah Terrorist or Hamas

Bassam Tawil

• The survey, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between August 5 and 8, 2026, reveals that… the fundamental political attitudes that have plagued Palestinian society for decades remain largely intact. Hamas remains a major political force; convicted terrorists and Hamas leaders remain popular candidates for the Palestinian Authority (PA) presidency; overwhelming majorities oppose the unconditional disarmament of Hamas; and Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen continue to enjoy remarkably high approval ratings.
• Asked who is most suitable to succeed PA President Mahmoud Abbas, 39% chose imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti… An Israeli court convicted him in 2004 of five counts of murder stemming from three terrorist attacks.
• Barghouti was sentenced to five consecutive life terms plus 40 years.
• Yet this is the man whom a majority of likely Palestinian voters would like to see as their next president.
• The second-place candidate is the head of Hamas.
• The PA parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 28, 2026, with presidential elections expected in early 2027. The PSR poll offers a warning of what those elections could produce.
• Hamas could still win another Palestinian Authority election (as it did in 2006).
• An overwhelming 72% say Hamas should not disarm before Israel completely withdraws from the Gaza Strip.
• US envoy Jared Kushner recently met Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya and other Hamas officials in Cairo as part of US efforts to advance President Donald J. Trump’s Gaza peace plan.
• Whatever the administration’s intentions, such meetings provide Hamas with something it has sought for years: international legitimacy.
• When representatives of the world’s leading superpower sit directly with Hamas leaders, Hamas can present the encounter to Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims as evidence that its strategy has succeeded.
• The message is that terrorism pays. If you carry out attacks, take hostages, retain your weapons and survive long enough – eventually the Americans will negotiate with you.
• These figures are difficult to reconcile with claims that Palestinian society is undergoing a transformation toward moderation.
• What exactly are these elections expected to accomplish?
• Elections are not automatically synonymous with democracy, moderation, or peace.
• The PA held a parliamentary election in 2006. Hamas participated and won. A year later, Hamas violently seized control of the Gaza Strip.
• Now the Palestinians may be heading toward another election in which Hamas could again emerge as the largest faction….
• Why, then, should the international community rush toward elections that could legitimize extremists and terrorists rather than marginalize them?
• Before elections, Palestinians need real political reform. The Palestinian Authority needs accountable institutions, independent courts, freedom of expression, an end to corruption, and, most importantly, a political culture that does not glorify terrorists or treat armed groups as legitimate alternatives to government.

Pictured: A poster of Barghouti in prisoner’s uniform, in a campaign office in Ramallah on March 3, 2021. (Photo by Abbas Momani/AFP via Getty Images)

Nearly three years after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel and following the devastating war in the Gaza Strip, one might have expected a fundamental change in Palestinian public opinion.

Palestinians might have turned away from Hamas, terrorism, and the Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance.” Palestinians also might have demanded new leaders committed to democracy, reform, an end to corruption, and peaceful coexistence.

The latest Palestinian public opinion poll, however, presents a disturbing picture.

The survey, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between August 5 and 8, 2026, reveals that although support for Hamas has declined, the fundamental political attitudes that have plagued Palestinian society for decades remain largely intact. Hamas remains a major political force; convicted terrorists and Hamas leaders remain popular candidates for the Palestinian Authority (PA) presidency; overwhelming majorities oppose the unconditional disarmament of Hamas; and Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen continue to enjoy remarkably high approval ratings.

Perhaps the most alarming finding concerns the identity of the Palestinians’ future leaders.

Asked who is most suitable to succeed PA President Mahmoud Abbas, 39% chose imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti. Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya came second with 16%, followed by former Fatah official Mohammed Dahlan with 15%.

In a hypothetical presidential election involving Abbas, Barghouti, and al-Hayya, Barghouti would receive an astonishing 54% of the votes among likely voters. Al-Hayya would receive 26%, while Abbas would receive only 14%.

Who is Marwan Barghouti?

He is not some imprisoned Palestinian political dissident. An Israeli court convicted him in 2004 of five counts of murder stemming from three terrorist attacks.

He was also convicted of attempted murder and membership in a terrorist organization. Barghouti was sentenced to five consecutive life terms plus 40 years.

Yet this is the man whom a majority of likely Palestinian voters would like to see as their next president.

The second-place candidate is the head of Hamas. That alone should cause alarm in Washington, Brussels and other Western capitals that continue to talk about Palestinian elections as though voting, by itself, will magically produce moderation and democracy.

The PA parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 28, 2026, with presidential elections expected in early 2027. The PSR poll offers a warning of what those elections could produce. If legislative elections were held today, Fatah would receive 32% of the votes and Hamas’s “Change and Reform” list would receive 29%. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas would actually come first, with 34% compared to 30% for Fatah.

In other words, Hamas could still win another Palestinian Authority election (as it did in 2006).

This is the same Hamas that carried out the October 7 massacre. Yet after everything that has happened since then, the terrorist group remains within striking distance of Fatah in an election.

True, Hamas has lost some support. Overall identification with Hamas has dropped from 35% ten months ago to 24%. Satisfaction with Hamas’s performance during the Gaza war has fallen from 60% to 42%.

These changes should not be ignored. Moreover, they should not be confused with a Palestinian repudiation of Hamas or its ideology.

When Palestinians are asked which faction is most deserving of representing and leading them, Hamas still beats Abbas’s Fatah: 28% to 21%. An encouraging 44% say neither faction deserves to lead, but Hamas nevertheless remains a major political player and retains the support of nearly one-quarter of the population.

Even more revealing is what Palestinians say about Hamas’s weapons.

An overwhelming 72% say Hamas should not disarm before Israel completely withdraws from the Gaza Strip. Only 20% support disarmament before a full Israeli withdrawal. Opposition to disarming Hamas reaches 79% in the West Bank and 62% in Gaza.

This is crucial. The problem, therefore, is not whether Palestinians approve or disapprove of Hamas’s performance. The issue is whether they believe Hamas should be allowed to retain its weapons and continue functioning as an armed organization.

The answer from nearly three-quarters of the respondents is clear: Yes, at least until Hamas’s condition of a full Israeli withdrawal is met.

This should be of particular concern to the Trump Administration and anyone expecting Hamas to disarm as part of the latest Gaza arrangements. Hamas is not operating in a political vacuum. It knows that a large majority of Palestinians oppose requiring it to surrender its weapons before an Israeli withdrawal.

The poll also shows why direct American engagement with Hamas is dangerous.

US envoy Jared Kushner recently met Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya and other Hamas officials in Cairo as part of US efforts to advance President Donald J. Trump’s Gaza peace plan.

Whatever the administration’s intentions, such meetings provide Hamas with something it has sought for years: international legitimacy.

When representatives of the world’s leading superpower sit directly with Hamas leaders, Hamas can present the encounter to Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims as evidence that its strategy has succeeded.

A US-designated terrorist organization that perpetrated the October 7 massacre is no longer merely being pressured to surrender; its leaders are sitting across the table from senior American representatives.

The message is that terrorism pays. If you carry out attacks, take hostages, retain your weapons and survive long enough – eventually the Americans will negotiate with you.

This perception is particularly dangerous just months before Palestinian elections. Instead of politically isolating Hamas, direct high-level engagement helps portray the terrorist group as an indispensable regional actor.

The PSR poll contains another warning: Palestinian admiration for Iran and its terrorist proxies remains extraordinarily high.

Satisfaction with the Houthis in Yemen stands at 61%. Hezbollah and Iran each receive 50%. Moreover, when Palestinians were asked where they stood during the recent US-Iran war, 45% said they sided with Iran, compared to only 12% who opposed Iran.

These figures are difficult to reconcile with claims that Palestinian society is undergoing a transformation toward moderation.

The Houthis have attacked Israel, Saudi Arabia and international shipping. Hezbollah has long functioned as Iran’s heavily armed proxy in Lebanon. Iran has funded and armed terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Yet these are among the regional actors receiving the highest Palestinian satisfaction ratings.

There are, admittedly, some encouraging findings in the poll. Support for armed struggle as the most effective strategy has fallen from 41% to 27%, while support for negotiations has increased from 36% to 44%. These are significant changes.

Yet even here, caution is required. Half of Palestinians still reject the proposition that armed resistance has failed to protect Palestinians or end the conflict despite the destruction suffered in Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Moreover, 36% still support a return to confrontations and an armed intifada (uprising) against Israel.

The Palestinian Authority, meanwhile, faces its own crisis of legitimacy.

Seventy-nine percent of Palestinians want Abbas to resign. Eighty-three percent believe there is corruption in PA institutions. Sixty-five percent say the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people rather than an achievement. Only 20% are satisfied with Abbas’s performance.

This raises a question Western governments should answer before celebrating the announcement of new Palestinian elections: What exactly are these elections expected to accomplish?

Elections are not automatically synonymous with democracy, moderation, or peace.

The PA held a parliamentary election in 2006. Hamas participated and won. A year later, Hamas violently seized control of the Gaza Strip.

Now the Palestinians may be heading toward another election in which Hamas could again emerge as the largest faction – or close enough to remain a dominant political player. Meanwhile, the leading candidate for PA president is serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison, and his principal Islamist rival is the leader of Hamas.

Why, then, should the international community rush toward elections that could legitimize extremists and terrorists rather than marginalize them?

Before elections, Palestinians need real political reform. The Palestinian Authority needs accountable institutions, independent courts, freedom of expression, an end to corruption, and, most importantly, a political culture that does not glorify terrorists or treat armed groups as legitimate alternatives to government.

Bassam Tawil is a Muslim Arab based in the Middle East. His work is made possible through the generous donation of a couple who wish to remain anonymous. Gatestone is most grateful.