Archive | 2024/07/03

Weganizm w Izraelu jest uważany za rasistowski wobec Palestyńczyków. Oczywiście.

Weganizm w Izraelu jest uważany za rasistowski wobec Palestyńczyków. Oczywiście.


Elder of Ziyon Tłumaczenie: Małgorzata Koraszewska

Na początku tego roku czasopismo „Settler Colonial Studies” opublikowało następujący artykuł:

Wegański nacjonalizm?: izraelski ruch na rzecz praw zwierząt w czasach walki z terroryzmem

Hiroshi Yasui

STRESZCZENIE

W ostatnich latach w Izraelu coraz większe znaczenie zyskuje ruch na rzecz praw i dobrostanu zwierząt (ruch na rzecz praw zwierząt), równolegle z praktyką etycznego weganizmu. Wraz z tym trendem w kilku badaniach rozważa się i analizuje kolonialne aspekty izraelskiego ruchu na rzecz praw zwierząt i jego znaczenie dla kwestii palestyńskiej z perspektywy Krytycznych Studiów nad Zwierzętami. Krytycznie analizując wcześniejsze badania na temat weganizmu i kolonializmu, poprzez analizę dyskursów politycznych czołowych aktywistów i osób publicznych w ramach nowo popularnego izraelskiego nurtu wegańskiego, a także wywiady z próbą izraelskich wegan, ten artykuł pokaże, w jaki sposób weganizm w Izraelu jest powiązany z narracją o izraelskiej wyższości narodowej. Takie dyskursy można śmiało nazwać „wegańskim nacjonalizmem”. Wegański nacjonalizm to ramy dyskursywne i regulacyjne, w których weganizm jest uważany za dowód moralnej wyższości narodu w kontekście kolonializmu osadniczego, pośrednio podkreślając barbarzyństwo i zacofanie „terrorystów”. Jednocześnie, jak wskazuje artykuł napisany przez Izraelskie Siły Obronne, w tym kontekście weganie prezentują mile widziany, pociągający wizerunek, który rezonuje, mimo że różni się od wizerunku silniejszego, solidniejszego i potężniejszego karnisty [wyznawca ideologii pozwalającej na jedzenie i wykorzystywanie zwierząt – przeciwieństwo weganina. przyp. tłum.] tradycyjnie faworyzowanego przez syjonistów.

Jak widzieliśmy w przypadku „pinkwashingu”, zasada oskarżenia polega na tym, że kiedy Izraelczycy robią coś, co jest zgodne z ulubionymi sprawami ruchu postępowego, należy to interpretować jako dowód na to, że Izraelczycy próbują ukryć swój z natury zły charakter. 

Nie mam dostępu do artykułu, ale widzę przypisy. Żaden przypis, jaki widziałem, nie potwierdza jego tezy.  

Na przykład widzę dwa odniesienia do strony internetowej IDF, gdzie rzekomo jesteśmy narażeni na narrację o żydowskiej supremacji moralnej, która poniża Palestyńczyków jako niemoralnych zjadaczy mięsa.

Jednym z nich był artykuł z 2017 roku w czasopiśmie IDF, który opisuje, w jaki sposób armia uwzględnia wegan, zarówno jeśli chodzi o wybór jedzenia, jak i odzieży, a drugim był bardziej obszerny artykuł o trudnościach bycia weganinem w IDF oraz o tym, jak armia pracuje nad tym, aby każdy czuł się dobrze. Omówiono nawet dylemat żołnierza, który zabija ludzi będąc weganinem:

Od czasu do czasu wegańscy wojownicy spotykają ludzi, którzy twierdzą, że sama ich rola jako wojownika jest niezgodna z ich aspiracjami do moralności, która wyraża się w wegańskim stylu życia. Major Friedman bardzo dobrze wie, jak sobie poradzić z tymi twierdzeniami. „Po prostu uważam, że to nieprawda. Zaciągnąłem się do wojska, żeby walczyć w obronie naszego kraju. W armii są bardzo jasne rozkazy, a nasza armia jest armią moralną. Jeśli w armii jest żołnierz, który robi coś, co jest zabronione, to zostaje ukarany – odpowiada. – Nie widzę związku między oszczędzaniem zwierząt a oszczędzaniem ludzi, którzy chcą zaszkodzić krajowi. Nasza armia nie jest armią przeznaczoną do zabijania, jest armią mającą na celu ochronę”.

Nie mogę znaleźć niczego w IDF, co choćby sugerowałoby, że uważa się ona za moralnie lepszą od jedzących mięso Palestyńczyków. Byłoby to absurdalne, skoro większość żołnierzy nadal je mięso. Ale jest uzasadniona duma, że oferuje żołnierzom wegańskim wybór jedzenia i odzieży.

Najbliższym przykładem wykorzystania przez IDF praw zwierząt do celów moralnych, jaki mogłem znaleźć, był ten tweet (który po prostu wskazuje, że Hamas krzywdzi zwierzęta): 

https://x.com/IDF/status/1029448371646423041?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1029448371646423041%7Ctwgr%5Ecbeed9d360869099de3fe872a386a296d47cb27a%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Felderofziyon.blogspot.com%2F2024%2F06%2Fveganism-in-israel-is-considered-racist.htmlKiedy robi to PETA, jest to moralne; kiedy robi to IDF, jest to niemoralne.

Mówiąc o PETA, na ich blogu opublikowano pochlebny artykuł na temat praw zwierząt w Izraelu (niecytowany w tym artykule: „Jeśli chodzi o uznawanie naturalnych praw zwierząt, Izrael wyprzedza wiele innych krajów. Izrael od dawna zakazuje sprzedaży produktów do pielęgnacji osobistej i gospodarstwa domowego, które są testowane na zwierzętach. Był to pierwszy kraj, który wprowadził zakaz używania wozów i powozów zaprzężonych w konie i osły do celów zawodowych”.

Inny artykuł, do którego autor omawianej pracy daje odnośnik, a który obala jego próby demonizowania Izraela, pochodzi z Vegan Review:

Okrzyknięta „najbardziej wściekłą weganką Izraela”, Tal Gilboa jest aktywistką, który robi różnicę.

W 2019 r., po dziesięciu latach działalności na rzecz praw zwierząt, została mianowana przez premiera Izraela jego doradczynią ds. dobrostanu zwierząt. Niektórzy postrzegali to jako manewr polityczny na rzecz Benjamina Netanjahu, ale dla Gilboa był to po prostu „historyczny dzień dla zwierząt”.

„W walce o zwierzęta nie ma lewicy ani prawicy – wyjaśniła. – Jeśli poprawia to dobrostan zwierząt i łagodzi ich cierpienie, jest to słuszna decyzja”.

Głos Gilboa nieco łagodnieje, gdy mówi o klanie Netanjahu. „To, co administracja Netanjahu zrobiła dla zwierząt, jest wzorowe – mówi. – To powinno mieć miejsce na całym świecie – działać w ramach panującego rządu, zamiast czekać, aż uformują się małe nisze zajmujące się prawami zwierząt; te nisze nie dają rezultatów”.

W ciągu czterech miesięcy na swoim nowym stanowisku Gilboa osiągnęła więcej, niż kiedykolwiek marzyła. Do jej zwycięstw dla zwierząt należy zakaz handlu futrami i polowania na niektóre gatunki ptaków. Pomogła także w opracowaniu ustawy Kaya (nazwanej na cześć psa Netanjahu), zgodnie z którą zaszczepione psy podejrzane o ugryzienie kogoś mogą zostać poddane kwarantannie w domu, zamiast być odbierane siłą właścicielom.

Żadne z tych źródeł nawet w najmniejszym stopniu nie pasuje do tego dziwacznego streszczenia. Aby obwiniać całe izraelskie społeczeństwo, autor musi uciekać się do cytowania zastępcy burmistrza Jerozolimy, który nazwał terrorystów „zwierzętami”, rzucając tym słowem jak obelgą.

Także jeśli przeszukasz ogólnie hasło dotyczące weganizmu w Izraelu, znajdziesz wiele artykułów, ale żaden z tych, które znalazłem, nie wspomina w jakikolwiek sposób o Palestyńczykach.

Chociaż nie ma dowodów na to, że Izraelczycy wykorzystują weganizm, aby ustawiać się jako osoby moralnie czyste w przeciwieństwie do Palestyńczyków, ogólnie rzecz biorąc, weganie są dobrze znani z tego, że są nieznośnie zadowoleni z własnej wyższości moralnej nad wszystkimi innymi.

Trudno oprzeć się wrażeniu, że autor tego artykułu przenosi swój własny pogląd, że jest moralnie lepszy od osób jedzących mięso, Izraelczyków i Palestyńczyków. To nonsens, ale tylko to wyjaśnia tę pracę, której własne przypisy nie potwierdzają tezy badacza.

Publikacja w „Settler Colonial Studies” sprawia, że cała dziedzina badań nad kolonializmem osadników wygląda jak kiepski dowcip. 


Link do oryginału: https://elderofziyon.blogspot.com/2024/06/veganism-in-israel-is-considered-racist.html
Elder of Ziyon, 23 czerwca 2024


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In 21st-century Europe, Jews need new allies

In 21st-century Europe, Jews need new allies

JONATHAN S. TOBIN


If many French Jews are backing Marine Le Pen and National Rally, it’s because the alternatives are an antisemitic left and a center that can’t or won’t defend them.

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French far-right Rassemblement National Rally Party leader Marine Le Pen, followed by party president Jordan Bardella, arrives on stage during an evening gathering on the final day of the European Parliament election, at the Pavillon Chesnaie du Roy in Paris, on June 9, 2024. Photo by Julien De Rose/AFP via Getty Images.

The shock and dismay about the results of the first round of the French parliamentary elections held last weekend on the part of most liberal observers of European politics is palpable. The victory of the right-wing National Rally Party led The New York Times to publish a number of dirge-like analyses declaring that the French were on the verge of catastrophe. That echoed the pronouncements of the country’s own liberal establishment about the vote. The possibility that the party led by Marine Le Pen would win a majority of the National Assembly after the second round to be held next Sunday is viewed by the leaders of the traditional mainstream parties of the center and left as nothing short of a disaster. For them, the likes of National Rally, Le Pen and even her 28-year-old protégé Jordan Bardella, who is in line to be France’s next prime minister if his party controls parliament, are no better than fascists.

One of the most curious elements of National Rally’s triumph is the fact that what may well be a significant percentage of the demographic slice of the French public that had hitherto been most deeply opposed to the party is now backing it. As a panicked article in Foreign Policy magazine plaintively asked this week, “Why are French Jews supporting the far right?”

Figures like famed Nazi hunter Serge Klarsfeld, as well as leading intellectual and author Alain Finkelkraut, have said that voting for National Rally is now an acceptable and even perhaps necessary action on the part of French Jews. As much as its steady progress towards electoral success in the last two decades, this is also a measure of both the sea change in opinion about the party and the increasingly desperate position of the French Jewish community as antisemitic invective and violence have become commonplace.

Antisemitism on the left

While historian Robert Zaretsky, the author of the Foreign Policy article, thinks that there is no excuse for this shift in opinion, the reality of contemporary France and the efforts of the National Rally party to move beyond its origins have made it inevitable. And the circumstances of the elections may have even made it necessary.

A huge immigrant population of Muslims—estimated to make up anywhere from 8% to 10% of the population—brought with them their contempt and hatred for Jews and Israel from their countries of origin. Suburban neighborhoods known as banlieues, where Muslims predominate on the outskirts of cities like Marseilles have been referred to as “no-go” zones for non-Muslims, as well as a source of violence against Jews. At the same time, the parties of the French left have largely embraced the same spirit of intolerance for Jews and Zionism that has been so apparent on American college campuses since the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the founder of France Unbowed—the coalition of Socialists, Communists, Greens and others on the left, and its candidate for president in the last three elections—is a virulent opponent of Israel.

These two forces have combined not merely to mainstream antisemitic attitudes and positions, but to be seen as incitement to the string of antisemitic hate crimes that have rocked France in recent years.

French President Emanuel Macron has opposed National Rally and the parties on the left. But in the current circumstances, he is allying himself with the left to stop Le Pen’s party from winning a majority. That feels like a betrayal to many French Jews, who rightly see the alliance of Marxists and Islamists—and not the right—as the main threat to their precarious existence.

Yet if they are now voting for National Rally, it’s not so much a case of them taking leave of their senses as it is one in which they are rationally assessing the situation and choosing new allies rather than allowing the past to dictate their actions.

From Dreyfus to Vichy to Le Pen

In the late 19th and throughout much of the 20th century, there was no doubt about which end of the French political spectrum was fundamentally antisemitic. The treason accusations against French Jewish Army officer Alfred Dreyfus in the 1890s helped galvanize a right-wing movement that coalesced behind the toxic myth that French Jews were a foreign and traitorous presence in the country. The anti-Dreyfusards were a manifestation of the same argument that had raged in France since 1789 about the legitimacy of the French Revolution. But it was only in the white heat of that controversy that old religious prejudices against Jews merged with modern notions of racism that had recently created the term “antisemitism.”

Jew-hatred was a feature of the French right throughout the decades that followed and became a core tenet after the collapse of the Third Republic after France was defeated by Nazi Germany in June 1940. The collaborationist Vichy regime that ruled part of the country under the leadership of Marshal Philippe Pétain and Pierre Laval actively assisted the Nazis in the roundup of Jews, dooming approximately 21% of them to death.

While the open antisemitism of Vichy was suppressed in French political culture in the decades after the war, and especially on the right by the dominance of Charles De Gaulle (who is remembered for his hostility to Israel in his last years in power, though embodied the resistance to Vichy and was opposed to antisemitism in France), it lingered on the margins of society. It seemed to come back to life in the waning years of the 20th century, and then at the start of the 21st, with the emergence of Jean Marie Le Pen and his National Front Party.

Le Pen was open about his antisemitism and even Holocaust revisionist beliefs. He represented not just traditional antisemitic rightists but the spirit of resentment felt by those who regarded France’s loss of Algeria and the subsequent ouster of about a million French citizens from that country (known as Pied-noirs) as an unforgivable defeat. As the surge of immigration from North Africa and former French colonies boosted the Muslim population, that resentment grew and led to limited electoral success for Le Pen. France was shocked when he made it into the second round of the French presidential election in 2002. Still, Le Pen only garnered 17.8% of the vote as the forces of the center, traditional Gaullist right and the left united in revulsion at even the theoretical prospect of his attaining power to support President Jacques Chirac.

Marine Le Pen’s shift

Le Pen was replaced as the head of his party in 2011 by his daughter, Marine, who is now 55. She set about the long and difficult task of rebranding and remaking it into something that could appeal to more than just the extreme right. French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy has referred to her as “the far-right with a human face,” but there is no denying that she has worked hard to transcend her father’s legacy. She even went as far as expelling him from the party she renamed National Rally for comments he made in 2015 dismissing the gas chambers used by the Nazis in the Holocaust as a “detail of history.” She forbade all mention of such Vichyite beliefs as well as any talk about France’s colonial wars.

While there’s little doubt that there are still some in its ranks who are more than comfortable with the prejudices articulated by the elder Le Pen, the party she currently heads is not the same as the one her father founded. And, to the chagrin of other parties, it has steadily gained support because of the growing influence of the Muslim population and the refusal of the parties of the mainstream right to do anything about it. Marine Le Pen made the presidential runoff in 2022 and won 33.9% of the vote, even though President Emanuel Macron easily won re-election.

But as Macron’s failures have grown, it is Marine Le Pen and National Rally that have now eclipsed his Renaissance Party, as well as what is left of the old Gaullist conservatives that the French president helped destroy as the main alternative to the parties of the left. And while her strong opposition to Islamism and support for the State of Israel, especially in the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attacks, are dismissed by mainstream media and the French liberal establishment as merely an attempt to cover up her party’s past, her positions stand in strong contrast to those of the left and even Macron. Both still regard her raising the issue of immigration as a threat to the essential nature of the French Republic.

As is the case elsewhere in Europe, questions about the collapse of national identity are changing the political landscape of France. Leftist sentiment that despises the legacy of Western civilization and the rise of an aggressive Islamist presence in nations where there are large numbers of immigrants has fueled a response from populist rightist parties. Like National Rally, such political factions are despised by the political establishments in Europe.  Some of them also have legacies from a fascist or antisemitic past that are worrisome. In the cases of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party and Netherlands political leader Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom, such problems have been successfully eclipsed. In Germany, the AfD Party seems unable to do the same.

During the recent European Union elections where populist parties won big, the National Rally was particularly successful. Worried about the implications of that victory for his government in Paris, Macron called a snap parliamentary election, hoping that he could duplicate past votes when, faced with the possibility of Le Pen’s party actually gaining power, French voters recoiled from the prospect. But he miscalculated.  The anger in France about the failures of Macron’s technocratic government to deal with the economy or the immigration issue led to the public more or less duplicating the results of the E.U. election last weekend, essentially eviscerating Macron’s party.

In response, Macron is trying to pull together a joint effort with the left to prevent National Rally from gaining a parliamentary majority. That would stop Bardella from becoming prime minister. Such a victory for Le Pen’s party would not only be unprecedented but also set her up for what might well be a successful run for the presidency of France in 2027 after Macron finishes his second term in office.

The Jewish dilemma

That leaves French Jews with an interesting dilemma. If they follow the lead of Macron, they will be empowering a left-wing faction that is not merely hostile to Israel but allied to forces that make it impossible for them to continue to live in the country due to justified fears of prejudice and violence. And that is why a great many of them have decided that throwing in with Le Pen is the only rational alternative.

Doing so requires not just disregarding the history of the French right. It also involves embracing the pushback against Islamism that can be branded as illiberal. Le Pen wants to ban the wearing of Muslim headscarves in public—an item of apparel that is considered a symbol of a dangerous shift in the culture of hyper-secular France and a threat to French national identity. In the past, Le Pen has also asked Jews to renounce their right to wear kippahs in public as a necessary sacrifice in order to defeat the threat of Islamism. That’s something the Jewish community can never accept.

We don’t know what a France led by Le Pen or Bardella will look like. Perhaps it will be like Hungary, where the populist right led by Viktor Orbán has proved to be both philo-semitic and pro-Israel despite Hungary’s troubled past. Perhaps not. But with French Jewish life more precarious than at any time since the Holocaust, supporting a party that is intent on rolling back Muslim political influence can be defended as a reasonable choice rather than a betrayal.

It’s easy for liberal Jews, especially those not currently living in Europe, to rule out alliances with groups that are opposed to intolerant Islamist and Marxist parties that present a clear and present threat to Jewish life. But to take such a stand is not so much a defense of liberal values as a refusal to live in the present. European Jewry must deal with the challenges of living in the 21st century rather than the past. Those who condemn French Jews for seeing Le Pen and National Rally as a lifeline are prioritizing the political interests of the left and European political establishments, not those of an embattled Jewish community.


Jonathan S. Tobin is editor-in-chief of JNS (Jewish News Syndicate). Follow him @jonathans_tobin.


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Temple Mount earth-filtering project discovers ancient clay tokens

Temple Mount earth-filtering project discovers ancient clay tokens

JUDY SIEGEL-ITZKOVICH


Tokens found in Temple Mount Sifting Project excavations may have been used by ancient pilgrims.

The clay token found in the sifting of dirt from the Temple Mount bearing the Greek Inscription ΔΟΥ-ΛΟ[Υ] (DOULOU) / (photo credit: ZACHI DVIRA)

More than a decade ago, a tiny clay token with a seal imprint depicting a wine jar (amphora) with a Greek inscription was discovered by a team working on the Temple Mount Sifting Project. Due to its resemblance to another clay token with an Aramaic inscription that had been found near the Temple Mount, scholars have wondered whether these sealings functioned as tokens for exchanging offerings used by pilgrims who ascended to the Temple.

Archaeologists are still trying to understand the nature of the 2,000-year-old mysterious clay token that was found in September 2011 while sorting pottery shards collected from previous siftings at the site. Archaeologist Gal Zagdon, who was in charge of the sifting facility, noted a tiny, irregularly shaped clay object. Upon closer inspection, it was clear that it was not a potsherd but a tiny lump of clay with a seal impression on it. Unlike common clay sealings (sometimes named bullae), its back side was pinched, suggesting it was a type of token given by hand to the recipient, unlike a sealing that was attached to a knot securing a document or container.

The seal impression depicts an amphora known from the second half of the first century CE (about 100 years before the Second Temple’s destruction). Six Greek letters appear around the wine jar; one of them was not well preserved in the imprint. The reading of the inscription, done with the kind help of Dr. Leah Di Segni of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HU) – an expert in ancient Greek epigraphy – resulted in the letters ΔΟΥ-ΛΟ[Υ] (DOULOU), the genitive (the grammatical case that marks a word, usually a noun, as modifying another word) of the personal name Doulês. Such a name was common in Thrace, Macedonia and the northern regions of the Black Sea – areas where Jews had settled by the late Hellenistic-Early Roman periods.

The token may have been used as payment by pilgrims ascending to the temple

Two months after the discovery of the Greek token, another very similar one was found in excavations at the drainage channel under Robinson’s Arch (below the Western Wall’s southern section), directed by Eli Shukrun and Prof. Ronny Reich of the Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA).

This token bore an Aramaic inscription that had initially been translated by the archaeologists as “pure to God.” However, HU Talmudic scholar Prof. Shlomo Naeh later suggested that the token was used by pilgrims ascending to the Temple as a token to receive their offerings after payment, with the writing on the sealing intended to prevent forgeries by including the abbreviations of the sacrifice type, the day, the month, and the name of the priestly division of that week.

A drone view shows the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount, at sunrise on the last Friday of Ramadan, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Jerusalem’s Old City April 5, 2024. (credit: ILAN ROSENBERG/REUTERS)

This practice is described in Mishna tractate Shekalim (5:4), the art of the oral Jewish law compiled in the 2nd century CE. Other scholars, including Prof. Ze’ev Safrai and Dr. Avi Shweika, criticized this interpretation and suggested other meanings for the token.

The Aramaic token adds further context to the Greek-inscribed token from the Temple Mount. Notably, it depicts a wine jar, aligning with the Mishnaic text that discusses nesachim, a term for the wine libation poured on the Temple altar and also used to refer generally to all the offering components. The researchers said it is plausible that this token was intended for Greek-speaking pilgrims, possibly including Jews from the diaspora. Significantly, the Mishna confirms the presence of Greek writing in the Temple, noting in another chapter of Tractate Shekalim (3:2) that baskets in the treasury chamber were marked with Greek letters.

In research conducted for the Hebrew University Institute of Archaeology, Dr. Yoav Farhi examined several clay tokens found in Jerusalem. Among them the two mentioned above, another token from the Temple Mount Sifting Project with a poorly preserved impression and another found in 1970 during the Jewish Quarter excavations by Prof. Nachman Avigad that bore a seal impression depicting a chalice symbol that also appeared on shekel coins from the last days of the Second Temple period, typically interpreted as one of the Temple vessels. Farhi confirmed Di Segni’s reading of the Greek inscribed token from the Temple Mount and examined the composition of the clay of the tokens, with the help of Prof. Yuval Goren from Ben-Gurion University, finding similarities between the token from the Jewish Quarter and that from the Temple Mount.

Clay sealings from the Early Roman period (the last two centuries of the Second Temple period) are very rare finds in Israel, and those with a pinched reverse side are not known from any other sites. All four tokens studied by Farhi were found in the proximity of the Temple Mount, and were likely associated in some way with the activities that took place in the Temple. Their style is completely different from that of other known tokens from the Roman world.

Many questions remain unanswered regarding these tokens: Who used them? Who issued them? How were they used? What is the significance of the wine jar symbol on the Greek inscribed token? Who was Doulês? Is the last letter in this name, which was poorly preserved, really an Upsilon? Are there other possible readings of this inscription?

The Temple Mount Sifting Project launched exactly 20 years ago aims to recover archaeological artifacts from 400 truckloads of soil rich with archaeological artifacts removed from the Temple Mount and dumped in the nearby Kidron Valley. This soil had been excavated illegally by the Waqf during construction activities in the late 1990s. The project’s goal is to salvage as many artifacts as possible from the discarded soil and study them extensively to shed new light on the archaeology and history of the Temple Mount. The sifting is carried out as a tourism-education attraction, with over 250,000 people participating so far, an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of archaeological research. The project has yielded more than half a million artifacts that are kept in its storage awaiting scientific and more widely popular publication.

As a result of the war, the Temple Mount Sifting Project has been plunged into a state of uncertainty regarding its future operations. Most of the project’s major donors have redirected their resources to support issues directly connected to the war, leaving the sifting operation facing potential closure in the coming months. In the last year, the project was approved for several government grants, and one was received just a few days before the war started. Still, all other grants are now on hold due to the government reallocating all available budgets to war-related issues.


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