Israel, Syria, Russia and the Shifting Middle East Sands

Eyal Zisser / Israel Hayom / JNS.org

Smoke rises after Syrian state media reported an Israeli missile attack in a container storage area, at Syrian port of Latakia, Syria, in this handout picture released by SANA on December 28, 2021. SANA/Handout via REUTERS

Earlier this month, a Russian air-defense battery stationed in Syria fired missiles at Israeli jets that had attacked a Syrian factory manufacturing weapons earmarked for Hezbollah.

The missile fire, the first incident of its kind since Russian military forces arrived in Syria seven years ago, was meant to show that, despite the war in Ukraine, Moscow is determined to maintain — no matter the cost — its foothold in Syria. Israeli officials, however, tended to interpret the missile fire as a warning signal and a message, whereby Russia could punish Israel for its position on the war in Ukraine by restricting and perhaps even negating Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian airspace.

As of now, this was an isolated incident and we can only hope it remains one, yet it raises doubts and even concerns. It also takes us back 55 years to the final weeks of May 1967 to the countdown before the Six-Day War — a war that no one expected and no one wanted.

Then too, Israel acted in Syria to foil the Syrians’ efforts to divert water from the Jordan River and against attacks carried out by Fatah terrorists, who the Syrians encouraged along Israel’s northern border. It’s possible the escalation along that border sparked concerns in Moscow that Israel was about to attack Syria, but it also seemed Russia wanted to exploit the events by pouring oil on the fire, create an atmosphere of war and thus ensure the fealty of their Arab allies and bolster Moscow’s regional standing.

As a result, the Russians warned the Arabs that Israel was set to attack Syria, while all of Israel’s denials fell on deaf ears. In doing so, the Russians initiated a snowball effect that led to the war’s eruption. In the wake of the Russian warning, then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser deployed his forces to the Sinai Peninsula, closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships and expelled all United Nations forces from the Gaza Strip.

The Arab world rallied for war against Israel, while Israelis were gripped by a sense of siege and strangulation. The war became inevitable. It seems the Russians were surprised by the cascade of events, lost control over them and were humiliated by the total defeat of the Arab armies, which they had armed and trained. In response, they severed ties with Israel as punishment for its victory.